metaphysics

What is the motive for this __ugitive_ way of saying ___? It is motivated by Dasein__ falling; for as falling, it *flees* in the face of itself into the __hey._ When the ___ talks in the __atural_ manner, this is performed by the they-self. What expresses itself in the ___ is that Self which, proximally and for the most part, I am *not* authentically. When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid succession [*Sich-jagen] of that with which one is concerned, the Self of the self-forgetful __ am concerned_ shows itself as something simple which is constantly selfsame but indefinite and empty. Yet one *is* that with which one concerns oneself. In the __atural_ ontical way in which the ___ talks, the phenomenal content of the Dasein which one has in view in the "I" gets overlooked; but this gives *no justification for our joining in this overlooking of it*, or for forcing upon the problematic of the Self an inappropriate __ategorial_ horizon when we Interpret the ___ ontologically.Of course by thus refusing to follow the everyday way in which the ___ talks, our ontological Interpretation of the ___ has by no means *solved* the problem; but it has indeed *prescribed the direction* for any further inquiries. In the __,_ we have in view that entity which one is in __eing-in-the-world_.Being-already-in-a-world, however, as Being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand-within-the-world, means equiprimordially that one is ahead of oneself. With the ___, what we have in view is that entity for which the *issue* is the Being of the entity that it is. With the ___, care expresses itself, though proximally and for the most part in the __ugitive_ way in which the ___ talks when it concerns itself with something. The they-self keeps on saying ___ most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it *is not authentically* itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being. If the ontological constitution of the Self is not to be traced back either to an ___-substance or to a __ubject_, but if, on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep on saying ___ must be understood in terms of our *authentic* potentiality-for-Being, then the proposition that the Self is the basis of care and constantly present-at-hand, is one that still does not follow. Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one__ authentic potentiality-for-Being-one__-Self__hat is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein__ Being *as care*. In terms of care the *constancy of the Self*, as the supposed persistence of the *subjectum*, gets clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opens our eyes for the *constancy of the Self*, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, _*Self-constancy*_ signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the Self__ Selfhood."__rom_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, pp. 368-369

The ___ is a bare consciousness, accompanying all concepts. In the ___, __othing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts_. __onsciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation_as it is a form of representation in general._ The __ think_ is __he form of apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it.__ant grasps the phenomenal content of the ___ correctly in the expression __ think_, or__f one also pays heed to including the __ractical person_ when one speaks of __ntelligence___n the expression __ take action_. In Kant__ sense we must take saying ___ as saying __ think._ Kant tries to establish the phenomenal content of the ___ as *res cogitans*. If in doing so he calls this ___ a __ogical subject_, that does not mean that the ___ in general is a concept obtained merely by way of logic. The ___ is rather the subject of logical behavior, of binding together. __ think_ means __ bind together_. All binding together is an _*I* bind together_. In any taking-together or relating, the ___ always underlies__he _οκείμενον [hypokeimenon; subjectum; subject]. The *subjectum* is therefore __onsciousness in itself_, not a representation but rather the __orm_ of representation. That is to say, the __ think_ is not something represented, but the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to have been represented. When we speak of the __orm_ of representation, we have in view neither a framework nor a universal concept, but that which, as εἶδο [eidos], makes every representing and everything represented be what it is. If the ___ is understood as the form of representation, this amounts to saying that it is the __ogical subject_.Kant__ analysis has two positive aspects. For one thing, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the ___ to a substance; for another thing, he holds fast to the ___ as __ think_. Nevertheless, he takes this ___ as subject again, and he does so in a sense which is ontologically inappropriate. For the ontological concept of the subject *characterizes not the Selfhood of the ___ qua Self, but the self-sameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand*. To define the ___ ontologically as _*subject*_ means to regard it as something always present-at-hand. The Being of the ___ is understood as the Reality of the *res cogitans*."__rom_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, pp. 366-367

To clarify the existentiality of the Self, we take as our __atural_ point of departure Dasein__ everyday interpretation of the Self. In *saying* _*I*,_ Dasein expresses itself about __tself_. It is not necessary that in doing so Dasein should make any utterance. With the ___, this entity has itself in view. The content of this expression is regarded as something utterly simple. In each case, it just stands for me and nothing further. Also, this ___, as something simple, is not an attribute of other Things; it is not *itself* a predicate, but the absolute __ubject_. What is expressed and what is addressed in saying __,_ is always met as the same persisting something. The characteristics of __implicity_, __ubstantiality_, and __ersonality_, which Kant, for instance, made the basis for his doctrine __f the paralogisms of pure reason_, arise from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience. The question remains whether that which we have experienced ontically in this way may be Interpreted ontologically with the help of the __ategories_ mentioned.Kant, indeed, in strict conformity with the phenomenal content given in saying __,_ shows that the ontical theses about the soul-substance which have been inferred [*erschlossenen*] from these characteristics, are without justification. But in so doing, he merely rejects a wrong *ontical* explanation of the ___; he has by no means achieved an *ontological* Interpretation of Selfhood, nor has he even obtained some assurance of it and made positive preparation for it. Kant makes a more rigorous attempt than his predecessors to keep hold of the phenomenal content of saying ___; yet even though in theory he has denied that the ontical foundations of the ontology of the substantial apply to the __,_ he still slips back into *this same* inappropriate ontology. This will be shown more exactly, in order that we may establish what it means ontologically to take saying ___ as the starting point for the analysis of Selfhood. The Kantian analysis of the __ think_ is now to be added as an illustration, but only so far as is demanded for clarifying these problems."__rom_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, p. 366

But how does it come about that while the __ think_ gives Kant a genuine phenomenal starting-point, he cannot exploit it ontologically, and has to fall back on the __ubject___hat is to say, something *substantial*? The ___ is not just an __ think_, but an __ think something_. And does not Kant himself keep on stressing that the ___ remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them?For Kant, however, these representations are the __mpirical_, which is __ccompanied_ by the _____he appearances to which the ___ __lings_. Kant nowhere shows the kind of Being of this __linging_ and __ccompanying_. At bottom, however, their kind of Being is understood as the constant Being-present-at-hand of the ___ along with its representations. Kant has indeed avoided cutting the ___ adrift from thinking; but he has done so without starting with the __ think_ itself in its full essential content as an __ think something_, and above all, without seeing what is ontologically __resupposed_ in taking the __ think something_ as a basic characteristic of the Self. For even the __ think something_ is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-point, because the __omething_ remains indefinite. If by this __omething_ we understand an entity *within-the-world*, then it tacitly implies that the *world* has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon of the world co-determines the state of Being of the __,_ if indeed it is to be possible for the ___ to be something like an __ think something_. In saying __,_ I have in view the entity which in each case I am as an __-am-in-a-world_. Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world, and was consistent enough to keep the __epresentations_ apart from the *a priori* content of the __ think_. But as a consequence the ___ was again forced back to an *isolated* subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.*In saying __,_ Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world*. But does saying ___ in the everyday manner have *itself* in view *as* being-in-the-world [*in-der-Welt-seiend*]? Here we must make a distinction. When saying __,_ Dasein surely has in view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the __orld_ with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it *fails to see* itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which it is itself. And this holds especially for the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world."__rom_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, pp. 367-370

The most perfect and satisfactory knowledge is that of perception but this is limited to the absolutely particular, to the individual. The comprehension of the many and the various into *one* representation is possible only through the *concept*, in other words, by omitting the differences; consequently, the concept is a very imperfect way of representing things. The particular, of course, can also be apprehended immediately as a universal, namely when it is raised to the (Platonic) *Idea*; but in this process, which I have analysed in the third book, the intellect passes beyond the limits of individuality and therefore of time; moreover, this is only an exception.These inner and essential imperfections of the intellect are further increased by a disturbance to some extent external to it but yet inevitable, namely, the influence that the *will* exerts on all its operations, as soon as that will is in any way concerned in their result. Every passion, in fact every inclination or disinclination, tinges the objects of knowledge with its colour. Most common of occurrence is the falsification of knowledge brought about by desire and hope, since they show us the scarcely possible in dazzling colours as probable and well-nigh certain, and render us almost incapable of comprehending what is opposed to it. Fear acts in a similar way; every preconceived opinion, every partiality, and, as I have said, every interest, every emotion, and every predilection of the will act in an analogous manner.Finally, to all these imperfections of the intellect we must also add the fact that it grows old with the brain; in other words, like all physiological functions, it loses its energy in later years; in this way all its imperfections are then greatly increased.___rom_The World as Will and Representation_. Translated from the German by E. F. J. Payne in two volumes: volume II, pp. 139-141

Rainer Maria Rilke greeted and wrestled with the angels of his Duino Elegies in the solitude of a castle surrounded by white cliffs tall trees and the sea. I greeted most of mine in the solitude of a house that still vibrated with the throbs of a singular life that had helped shape many lives and with the ache of attempts to render useful service to that life. The River of Winged Dreams was therefore constructed as a link between dimensions of past and future emotions and intellect and matter and spirit.

Time is the Mind of Space.

The unity of scientific and spiritual knowledge is realized when each of the particular sciences is organically related to the supreme knowledge of al-tawhid.

Zsoronga, Sorweel was beginning to realize, possessed the enviable ability to yoke his conviction to his need _ to believe, absolutely, whatever his heart required. For Sorweel, belief and want always seemed like ropes too short to bind together, forcing him to play the knot as a result.

MUSIC OF THE UNIVERSEWithout the orchestra of the universe,There would be no ether. And without its instrumentationBy the ether, There would be no waves. And without any waves, There would be no sound. And without sound, There would be no music. And without music, There would be no life. And without a life force, There would be no matter. But it does not matter - Because what is matter, If there is no light?

In meetings philosophy might work,on the field practicality works.

In the pragmatist, streetwise climate of advanced postmodern capitalism, with its scepticism of big pictures and grand narratives, its hard-nosed disenchantment with the metaphysical, 'life' is one among a whole series of discredited totalities. We are invited to think small rather than big _ ironically, at just the point when some of those out to destroy Western civilization are doing exactly the opposite. In the conflict between Western capitalism and radical Islam, a paucity of belief squares up to an excess of it. The West finds itself faced with a full-blooded metaphysical onslaught at just the historical point that it has, so to speak, philosophically disarmed. As far as belief goes, postmodernism prefers to travel light: it has beliefs, to be sure, but it does not have faith.

if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like

What is this slow blue dream of living, and this fevered death by dreaming?

Everybody make words,' he continued. 'Everybody write things down. Children in school do lessons in my books. Teachers put grades in my books. Love letters sent in envelopes I sell. Ledgers for accountants, pads for shopping lists, agendas for planning week. Everything in here important to life, and that make me happy, give honour to my life.'The man delivered his little speech with such solemnity, such a grave sense of purpose and commitment, I confess that I felt moved. What kind of stationery store owner was this, I wondered, who expounded to his customers on the metaphysics of paper, who saw himself as serving an essential role in the myriad affairs of humanity? There was something comical about it, I suppose, but as I listened to him talk, it didn't occur to me to laugh.

Time (again, Time) like the soul, wears many faces, many bodies and climates and attitudes. The past is one face, the present a second and the future yet another.

Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us, but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest assumptions in this science without realizing, until challenged, what internal difficulties they involve.

Theology, philosophy, metaphysics, and quantum physics are merely ways for God to have his smart people believe in him