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But how does it come about that while the __ think_ gives Kant a genuine phenomenal starting-point, he cannot exploit it ontologically, and has to fall back on the __ubject___hat is to say, something *substantial*? The ___ is not just an __ think_, but an __ think something_. And does not Kant himself keep on stressing that the ___ remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them?For Kant, however, these representations are the __mpirical_, which is __ccompanied_ by the _____he appearances to which the ___ __lings_. Kant nowhere shows the kind of Being of this __linging_ and __ccompanying_. At bottom, however, their kind of Being is understood as the constant Being-present-at-hand of the ___ along with its representations. Kant has indeed avoided cutting the ___ adrift from thinking; but he has done so without starting with the __ think_ itself in its full essential content as an __ think something_, and above all, without seeing what is ontologically __resupposed_ in taking the __ think something_ as a basic characteristic of the Self. For even the __ think something_ is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-point, because the __omething_ remains indefinite. If by this __omething_ we understand an entity *within-the-world*, then it tacitly implies that the *world* has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon of the world co-determines the state of Being of the __,_ if indeed it is to be possible for the ___ to be something like an __ think something_. In saying __,_ I have in view the entity which in each case I am as an __-am-in-a-world_. Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world, and was consistent enough to keep the __epresentations_ apart from the *a priori* content of the __ think_. But as a consequence the ___ was again forced back to an *isolated* subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.*In saying __,_ Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world*. But does saying ___ in the everyday manner have *itself* in view *as* being-in-the-world [*in-der-Welt-seiend*]? Here we must make a distinction. When saying __,_ Dasein surely has in view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the __orld_ with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it *fails to see* itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which it is itself. And this holds especially for the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world."__rom_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, pp. 367-370