Aristotle

Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship.

Tolerance and apathy are the last virtues of a dying society.

The only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law.

Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.

The gods too are fond of a joke.

For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways?

Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

You will never do anything in this world without courage. It is the greatest quality of the mind next to honor. __ristotle

The ideal man bears the accidents of life with dignity and grace, making the best of circumstances."_ Aristotle

Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees the others.

Tis the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

The high-minded man must care more for the truth than for what people think.

Nature does nothing uselessly.

Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work.

With the truth, all given facts harmonize; but with what is false, the truth soon hits a wrong note.

With respect to the requirement of art, the probable impossible is always preferable to the improbable possible.

He who cannot be a good follower cannot be a good leader.

We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically; up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul. We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single account, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate account of each sort of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the universal, animal__nd so too every other common predicate__s either nothing or posterior). Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts? It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these parts are in nature distinct from one another. Again, which ought we to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on? If the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further question suggests itself: ought we not before either to consider the correlative objects, e.g. of sense or thought? It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the incidental proprieties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances (as in mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and (the plane) but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: for, when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favourable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that subject: in all demonstration a definition of the essence is required as a starting point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the incidental properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile." __rom_On the Soul: Book I_